NHB(ND)/HFC/BP&P/2966/2005
June 21, 2005
Dear Sir,
Fraudulent
Transactions in Housing Finance
It is observed that
incidences of fraudulent transactions in the housing finance sector have
been growing during the last few years. To share the modus operandi and
causative factors of such frauds, the Fraud Management Cell in NHB has been
collecting such information from HFCs, RBI & IBA etc. and circulating
the same to HFCs to enable them to take adequate precautions, exercise due-diligence
and initiate timely corrective actions to avoid occurrences of such
fraudulent incidences in future.
2. In the past NHB
has issued four Circulars on the modus operandi, causative factors etc
relating to fraudulent transactions in housing finance.
3. In this context a
detailed Circular superceding the earlier Circulars, indicating the
causative factors and suggestive remedial actions is enclosed for your
information and necessary action.
4. The contents of
the Circular may be circulated amongst your staff functionaries especially
at the branch level for taking necessary safe-guards and exercising
adequate controls to avoid occurrence of fraudulent transactions.
Yours faithfully,
(P K Kaul)
General Manager
Encl: as above
Guidelines on Causes and Remedial Actions on
Incidence of
Frauds in Housing Finance
Point No.1
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Type of Frauds
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Fabrication of
Income Documents like Income-tax return, salary slip/balance sheet etc.
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Severity of fraud
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LOW
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Modus Operandi
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Committed
generally by borrowers in connivance with Direct Selling Agent/Estate
Agent/Builders.
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Mitigating
factors/Suggestions for Preventive Cures
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- Verification of salary slips with employer.
- Income Tax Department should upload on their
website the list of Income Tax payers and defaulters.
- Salary amount should be compared with Bank
Statement.
- Cross verification of balance sheet.
- Personal interview of the borrower plays very
important role.
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Point No.2
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Type of Frauds
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Loan amount
disbursed by way of cheque/Demand drafts are encashed by third
party/agents etc.
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Severity of fraud
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MEDIUM
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Modus Operandi
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Disbursed amount
cheques are collected by the Agents/third parties from the borrower's
bank and deposited in fictitious account opened for this purpose and
amounts are withdrawn from such bogus account.
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Mitigating
factors/Suggestions for Preventive Cures
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- Cheques should be issued in the name of
bankers to the Builders with the bank account number on it.
- Cheque should not be handed over to the
borrower/agent/seller. Bank's Marketing Officials can be sent for
delivery of cheque to the builders/sellers of property at the
registered address mentioned in the title deeds.
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Point No.3
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Type of Frauds
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Title documents
being forged – Stamped documents forged by borrower customer/builder
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Severity of fraud
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HIGH
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Modus Operandi
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Coloured Xerox
copy of various documents are produced including encumbrance certificate,
fake stamp papers etc. which are difficult to identify/distinguish from
the original one.
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Mitigating
factors/Suggestions for Preventive Cures
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- Tracking and sharing of all information among
the HFCs and Banks about names of blacklisted builders &
developers.
- Agreement for sale/document of title should be
in DEMAT form.
- In case of large value loans, HFCs can
approach the Sub-Registrar's Office to verify the genuineness of
stamp paper/documents/registration receipts etc.
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Point No.4
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Type of Frauds
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Over valuation of
the property
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Severity of fraud
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MEDIUM
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Modus Operandi
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These frauds are
committed to draw higher loan amount by the borrower in connivance with
the builders/valuers. The value of the property are inflated by including
various expenditure and additional amenities, fixtures, legal charges,
society advance, maintenance charges etc. which are non-existing.
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Mitigating
factors/Suggestions for Preventive Cures
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- For valuation over Rs. 25 lacs, valuation
should be done by two independent valuers.
- Government should introduce certification
course for the approved valuers.
- HFCs should develop in house expertise for
valuation of properties.
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Point No.5
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Type of Frauds
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Multiple financing
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Severity of fraud
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HIGH
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Modus Operandi
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These frauds are
extension of the fake documents that are produced to different banks/HFCs
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Mitigating
factors/Suggestions for Preventive Cures
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- Tracking & sharing of information among
the banks and HFCs about names of black listed builders &
developers selling same properties to more than one buyer.
- Agreement for sale/document of title should be
in DEMAT form.
- HFC should insist on the original title deeds
of the landed property on which structure is built.
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Point No.6
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Type of Frauds
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Cancellation of
booking of flats/property i.e. collusion between customer and builder
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Severity of fraud
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MEDIUM
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Modus Operandi
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In this case after
availing the initial loan amount, the booking is cancelled and the
borrower directly take the refund from the builders.
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Mitigating
factors/Suggestions for Preventive Cures
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Registration
receipt issued by Registrar of stamp office should bear hypothecation
clause as in case of certificate of registration in case of auto loans.
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Point No.7
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Type of Frauds
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Sale of property
by loanee without clearing existing loan.
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Severity of fraud
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MEDIUM
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Modus Operandi
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Property is sold
through duplicate/fake title deeds even though legal title is with the
HFC.
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Mitigating
factors/Suggestions for Preventive Cures
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- Equitable mortgage should be created at
Registrar's office by deposit of title deeds. For this purpose all
banks should represent to Central & State Government through IB
A & RBI for enactment of necessary provisions.
- Internal due diligence plays important role to
prevent this type of frauds.
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Point No.8
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Type of Frauds
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Mis-representation
of end use of loan
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Severity of fraud
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LOW
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Modus Operandi
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Loan taken for
residential housing property. However, commercial property is purchased
by availing such loan.
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Mitigating
factors/Suggestions for Preventive Cures
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In order to ensure
end use of loan, HFCs should depute officers for inspection/verification
of property, whether it is residential housing property or commercial
property.
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Point No.9
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Type of Frauds
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Sale of property
by builder without clearing/repaying Construction Funding Loan availed by
them from banks/HFCs
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Severity of fraud
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MEDIUM
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Modus Operandi
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Builders/property
developers after taking Construction loan from banks/HFCs are selling
developed ready flats/Galas/developed plots etc. without knowledge of
their financiers & without repaying construction funding loan to
them.
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Mitigating
factors/Suggestions for Preventive Cures
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- This aspect of construction funding loan
whether availed by the developer/builder or not, should be verified
at project clearance level by banks/HFCs.
- Original document should be called for
verifications at the time of appraisals of any housing loans.
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Circular
NHB(ND)/HFC(P&D)/15.3/6065/2003
December 10, 2003
CONFIDENTIAL
To Chief Executives
of all Registered HFCs
Dear Sir,
Fraudulent
transactions in disbursal of home loans
It has been reported
to us that unscrupulous borrowers have defrauded a number of primary
lending institutions (PLIs), mainly the housing finance companies,
scheduled commercial banks etc. by obtaining multiple finance against the
same property/or through submission of fake/forged/stolen documents
including fake title deeds. The borrowers had offered the same guarantors
to all the institutions from whom they have availed housing loans on the
aforesaid property. The modus operandi adopted in the perpetration of
frauds were reported to be as under:
i) In connivance
with the builders/scheme organizers or any of its members, the borrowers
prepared a number of original sets of documents and submitted to various
PLIs. They might be well aware of and acquainted with housing loan
appraisal systems in various PLIs and had accordingly prepared the
application and paper work to meet with the requirements of PLIs.
ii) In certain cases, Title clearance report (TCR) was obtained from
approved panel of advocates of PLIs with a detailed legal appraisal report
stating that advocate had taken a search in revenue/government records for
the last 30 years regarding the title of land/property. They had certified
that the title of the particular flat was clear, marketable and applicant
was a real and bonafide allottee and hence the creation of equitable
mortgage was possible by depositing various title deeds/papers. No advocate
had pointed out any thing adverse.
iii) Common chartered accountants’ services were utilized who might have
provided/fabricated some income tax returns and other methodology.
iv) Whenever pre/post visits were undertaken by PLIs, the colluding
organizers/builders/applicant had shown the same flat to the visiting
officials. Almost all the flats were found vacant during such visits.
v) In all accounts, registration of lien and creation of equitable mortgage
was properly carried out with payment of appropriate stamp duty.
2. The other types
of modus operandi which have led to frauds and have come to our notice wee
as under:
i) In may cases,
same property was offered as security to different HFCs/banks by submitting
fake title deeds. Borrowers availed housing loan by providing color photo
copy of the sale deed and by submitting fake documents/Sale deed and forged
signatures of builder.
ii) In some cases, the mortgaged properties were found to be non-existent,.
iii) Loans were granted to persons without verifying their
antecedents/credentials and as a result they were found to be non-existent
subsequently.
iv) The documents submitted for availing the loans such as title deeds,
income tax returns, salary certificates etc. were found to be
fake/fictitious.
v) The chartered accountants who had purportedly issued/verified the
documents were found to be non-existent themselves.
vi) In a number of fraud cases, the builders/developers defrauded the
HFCs/banks by pocketing the housing loans which they managed to obtain in
the names of fictitious persons by submitting forged documents.
vii) In certain cases, builders/developers/vendors in connivance with the
borrowers arranged housing loans from HFCs/banks by submitting
fake/forged/manipulated salary certificates. Such loans were subsequently
misappropriated.
viii) In certain cases, loan disbursement cheque issued in favour of the
builder was handed over to the borrower in good faith. Borrower/co-borrower
fraudulently encashed the loan disbursement cheque/draft issued in favour of
builder/developer by opening a Bank Account in the name of builder firm.
ix) The flat against which housing loan is taken by the borrower has been
sold to another party led by the developer/builder.
3. Keeping in view
the above, Housing Finance Companies are advised to take extra precautions
while accepting/verifying the documents, handing over the loan disbursement
cheques, verifying the credentials and bonafides of the borrowers/vendors
etc. Accordingly, branch level functionaries have to be vigilant in this
regard. You may therefore review the existing system and controls and plug
the lacunae therein to prevent occurrence of such frauds. The Board of
Directors may be kept apprised, on a periodical basis, of the
irregularities revealed and the likely loss on this accounts.
Yours faithfully,
Sd/-
(Lalit Kumar)
Assistant General Manager
No. 003/VGL/29
Government of India
Central Vigilance Commission
Satarkta Bhawan,
Bllock ‘A’
GPO Complex, INA,
New Delhi – 11 0023
Dated the 11th March, 2004
Office Order No.
18/03/04
To
All the Chief
Vigilance Officers of PSBs
Subject: Sanction of
Housing loan/Consumer loan by PSBs – procedural lapses
Regarding.
The Commission is in
receipt of very large number of references from banks regarding
irregularities in the grant of Housing loan/Consumer loan viz. –
a) Non-verification
of genuineness of the identity and records of the borrowers.
b) Absence of visit to the housing site, independent enquiries with
employer of the borrowers.
c) Negligence in handing over pay orders to the borrowers instead of direct
delivery to the builders/housing societies/housing development agencies.
2.As sanctioning of
these loans are being pursued as high priority activities by banks and
tough targets are being fixed, unscrupulous elements are taking advantages.
3.All he Public
Sector Banks are advised to take urgent remedial and proactive steps to guard
against these frauds.
4.CVOs may bring
this to the notice of all concerned.
Sd/-
(Anjana Dube)
Deputy Secretary
NHB(ND/HFC(P&D/15.3/592/2004
March 31, 2004
***Address Block***
Dear Sir,
Sanction of Housing
Loan – Procedural Lapses.
Central Vigilance Commission
is in receipt of a large number of references of following nature from
financial institutions regarding irregularities in the grant of housing
loan.
i. Non-verification
of the identity and records of the borrowers.
ii. Absence of visit to the housing site and independent enquiries with
employer of the borrower.
iii. Negligence in handing over the pay orders to the borrowers instead of
direct delivery to builders/housing societies/housing development agencies.
With the rapid
growth in housing finance business and increasing competition, a number of
unscrupulous elements are reportedly misusing he system and taking
advantage. All housing finance companies are advised to take urgent
remedial and proactive steps to guard against these frauds.
Yours faithfully,
Sd/-
(R.V. Verma)
Executive Director
CREDIT INFORMATION
RAEVIEW
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BANKING 301 AUGUST 2004
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Minimizing incidence
of Frauds
Observing that there
were administrative lapses in the processing of applications and in
monitoring of accounts in a large number of cases reported as frauds, the
Advisory Board on Bank. Commercial and Financial Frauds has offered an
illustrative list of deficiencies noticed at the sanctioning/monitoring
stage and suggestions to improve the system. The list of deficiencies
noticed and the suggestions for minimizing the incidence of frauds in the
advances portfolio are:
Deficiencies
At the sanction
stage
(i) Credit proposals
were not appraised with due diligence. High projections of the borrowing
company were not critically analyzed. In some cases, credit limits were
sanctioned on the basis of appraisal made by the Merchant Banking Division
for the purpose of public issue and no separate assessment for credit risk
was done.
(ii) Term loans were sanctioned without insisting on the project report,
cost of project and means of finance.
(iii) Additional loans were sanctioned at the time of mid-term review of projects,
without proper appreciation of the market conditions and the factors which
led to time and cost overruns.
(iv) Irregularities based on stock verification reports, audit reports
etc., pointed out by lower level functionaries were overlooked.
(v) Officials in controlling offices/branches did not give full facts about
borrowers and projects to the sanctioning authorities.
(vi) Despite being aware of the unsatisfactory position of borrower
accounts, facilities were sanctioned overlooking the deficiencies.
(vii) The fact that at the time of take over of accounts, the borrowing
company had irregular accounts with the previous bank/s, was overlooked.
(viii) Adhoc limits were sanctioned frequently even when the company had
regular limits and its accounts were running irregularly.
(ix) The terms and conditions prescribed at the time of sanction of loan
facilities were subsequently relaxed while disbursing funds without any
justification for such relaxation.
(x) In some cases, the sanctioning authorities acted on extraneous
influences, rather than deciding on the merits of the case.
At the monitoring
stage:
i) Terms and conditions for sanction of loans and advances laid down by the
central office were blatantly violated by branch officials.
ii) Companies’ financial standing and end-use of funds by borrowers were
not properly monitored.
iii) Chartered accountants’/valuers’ certificates were unduly relied upon
without co-operating them with other relevant procedures.
iv) Banks failed to detect disappearance of stocks given as security
resulting in misappropriation of funds/sale of stock and realization of
receivables without their knowledge.
CONTENTS
BANKING
Minimizing incidence
of frauds
Opening of accounts
RTGS Services for Bank Customers
POLICY
Ceiling for Lok Adalat
Cases Raised
Inclusion of Self Help Group under PMRY
Additional Provisioning for NPAs
UCBs
UCB Directors not to
stand as Surety/Guarantors
Opening of Current Accounts
90 Day Norm for Gold/Small Loans
Temporary Overdraft/Cheque Purchase Facilities
Capital investment Subsidy Scheme
INFORMATION
Proposed Board for
Payment and Settlement Systems
NPAs and Recoveries of Public Sector Banks.
(v) Banks failed to
ensure adequacy of the security offered by borrowers, and also failed to
verify whether the same asset was mortgaged to another Bank/FI.
(vi) After the funds were lent, accounts were not reviewed periodically.
(vii) Proper assessment of the financial standing of the projects was not
carried out when the accounts were taken over from another bank.
(viii) Excess drawings in the borrowal accounts permitted by the
branch/regional office level functionaries, were ratified by the head
office in a routine manner without examining the need for such permissions.
(ix) Limits sanctioned were allowed to be interchanged indiscriminately
without proper authority.
(x)As regards term loans for financing projects, important terms and
conditions of the sanction stipulated by the board of directors, such as,
induction of technical directors, constitution of audit committees and
independent project monitoring committees were not taken seriously.
Suggestions
(i) Lending banks
should obtain a certificate from the borrowers on a quarterly basis
furnishing details of accounts opened with other banks.
(ii) Banks may consider setting up of independent cells for valuation, to
be manned by technical personnel with the right expertise.
(iii) Immediate action should be taken where the malafides/gross negligence
by dealing officials are noticed. Wherever there is a prima facie case
against the dealing officials, appropriate action in terms of the Central
Vigilance Cell (CVC) guidelines for their inclusion in the list of officers
with doubtful integrity should be initiated in consultation with the
Central Bureau of Investigation.
(iv) Banks should evolve a process of check listing to enable them to take
note of any deficiency while releasing funds to the borrowers or monitoring
their end-use.
(v) Banks should build up a cadre of officials with proper educational
background and training to take care of at least large projects.
(vi) In the case of project finance, disbursements should be made only
after promoter/borrower brings in his stipulated contribution.
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